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Abstract— Internet protocol based networking is gaining
ground in armed forces, leading to a concept described by the
NATO as network centric capabilities (NCC). The goal is to
enable state-of-the-art, affordable and powerful electronic in-
formation services to the troops. A tighter connection of the
forces is expected to further enhance the joined strike capa-
bilities. Providing secure information exchange within groups
of armed forces is one aspect of the NCC concept. Such
group communication is enabled by the multicast feature of
the IP technology. Security requirements are met by using the
IP security (IPsec) architecture. IPsec enables secure commu-
nication between secure private networks via an unsecured
public text network. While secure unicast transmission with
IPsec is common, only few achievements have been made to se-
cure multicast transmissions. The protection of multicast data
traffic of a group in an automated way is described in this doc-
ument. We utilize an automatic detection of IPsec devices and
an efficient key management protocol to reach our aim.
Keywords— secure group communication group key manage-
ment, multicast IPsec, automatic IPSec device discovery.
1. Introduction
Establishment of keys and protocol parameters is necessary
to enable IP security (IPsec) for securing network traffic.
Such a set of keys and parameters is called security associa-
tion (SA) in IPsec terminology. Manual configuration of the
IPsec capable nodes is a time consuming task. Moreover
deploying pre-shared keys for network encryption renders
all IPsec nodes insecure if a single node is compromised.
To overcome these caveats in point-to-point communication
the Internet key exchange protocol (IKE) has been created.
It provides an automated configuration of IPsec devices.
IKE enforces a set of security policies (SPs) such as mini-
mum key length or maximum key life-time and configures
security associations at the IPsec devices.
For multicast IPsec on the other hand, no automated way
for configuration exists yet. It is required to have both au-
tomated key and IPsec parameter establishment for group
communication, too. In many situations group communi-
cation needs to be secure, but trained computer special-
ists might not be available for manual configuration. Our
two-parted approach addresses both requirements: easy to
maintain and secure. One component of our concept is the
IPsec discovery protocol (IDP) [10]. It discovers IPsec ca-
pable devices and configures them in an automated way.
The second component is the multicast Internet key ex-
change protocol (MIKE) [5, 9, 18]. It negotiates and es-
tablishes a group key in a secure manner. By combining
the two, an automatically secured network is possible. Only
a one-time configuration of the affected network nodes is
necessary in our approach. After that, the system self-
maintains its security properties, even if nodes join or leave
the group.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives account
of previous work done in the realm of key management
and IPsec discovery protocols. Our target use case is de-
scribed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 goes into the details
of the protocol communication. Our performance analysis
deployment is described in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
summarizes and gives a further outlook.
2. Previous work
In this section, we want to give an overview of existing key
management and IPsec discovery solutions. We want to
motivate, why MIKE and the IDP were chosen to automate
network encryption.
The IPsec discovery protocol clients run at the borders of
secure (“red”) networks and un-secure public (“black”) net-
works. Their task is to discover red enclaves and inter-
connect them over the black network. A global discovery
protocol for IPsec devices is described in [1]. It describes
an infrastructure with a worldwide hierarchy of servers in
a domain name system (DNS)-like manner (client-server
discovery – CSD). Although different balancing schemes
are discussed, the architecture relies on a single root server,
which is considered to be a single point of failure.
Another possibility to locate IPsec routers is to reserve spe-
cial IP addresses in each network prefix for them. It elim-
inates the need for a discovery protocol at all. This im-
plicit peer enclave discovery protocol (IMPEPD) called so-
lution scales well, but offers little flexibility. Another mech-
anism is called multicast discovery (MD), reaching neigh-
bor routers via a multicast router request. Because of its
reactive nature it may impose latency especially in dynamic
environments. All of these proposals are expected to be
included or are already part of high assurance Internet pro-
tocol encryptor interoperability specification (HAIPE IS)
Version 3, the U.S. approved version of IPsec.
An approach which overcomes most of the limitations of the
existing IPsec discovery mechanisms is the IPsec discovery
protocol. IDP relies on IP multicasting within the black
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network. Because of its proactive nature and because it
needs no special servers, it is best suited for medium scale
networks. Larger scale networks can be enabled by parti-
tioning them and introducing IDP security gateways. IDP
is able to configure IPsec security associations and enforces
a common IPsec security policy within the domain. Cer-
tificates are distributed by IDP, too.
Table 1 summarizes the comparison of the different discov-
ery mechanisms. The capability to handle a large number
of networks, robustness against the loss of parts of the in-
frastructure, flexibility and imposed latency is taken into
account.
Table 1
Comparison of discovery architectures
Discovery
mechanism
Scalability Robustness Flexibility Latency
IMPEPD Good Good Worst Best
MD Average Good Good Worst
CSD Best Average Average Good
IDP Good Good Good Good
A key management service is necessary to enable multicast
IPsec. The key management establishes a common group
key at all IPsec devices. The key establishment takes place
over the black network, so it has to be done in a secure
manner. Public key cryptography and certificates are often
used to accomplish this task. Once the common key is es-
tablished, a confidential and authenticated communication
through the black network is possible. Additionally, a key
management system should be able to support users to join
and leave the group without sacrificing security.
Different protocols and key management architectures exist.
An overview of existing approaches is given in Fig. 1. For
security reasons adding and excluding members of a group
enforces a key change. Algorithms which support the fre-
quent change of group keys are called “dynamic” key man-
agement approaches. The pre-distributed group keys (PGK)
method is the only listed system which uses a static key and
does not support frequent changes. For this reason it is only
practicable for small, static groups.
Fig. 1. Overview of group key management mechanisms.
Most of the algorithms rely on a centralized or hierarchical
structure. Centralized systems like group key management
protocol (GKMP) [11] or group domain of interpretation
(GDOI) [12] contain a server. On the one hand a server
is considered as a single point of failure. On the other
hand, building a hierarchical system often involves invest-
ing in a costly infrastructure (scalable multicast key dis-
tribution – SMKD [16]) or doing expensive de- and re-
encryption (IOLUS [15]). At first sight, distributed key
management mechanisms seem to offer both efficiency and
robustness. But most of the distributed systems depend on
a reliable or ordered delivery of messages (e.g., tree-based
group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [13]). Such a service is not
offered by IP multicast. Some algorithms only utilize dis-
tributed systems to spread the key, while the calculation is
done by a single instance (distributed one-way function tree
(DOFT) [14]). An attacker would concentrate on this point.
To overcome the limitations of the existing key management
mechanisms, the group key management system MIKE in
the key agreement (KA) mode has been developed. Even
though MIKE offers a distributed key management, it does
not depend on ordered or reliable message transport. MIKE
operates on top of the standard UDP/IP layer. A transac-
tion manager (TM) spreads topology and status informa-
tion to the clients. After that, every authenticated mem-
ber is able to calculate the group key itself. Any device
can hold the transaction manager status. The MIKE pro-
tocol defines which IPsec device is the current transaction
manager. Mechanisms exist to elect a new TM if a TM be-
comes unreachable. Scalability and performance have been
evaluated. Utilizing the key agreement operation mode of
MIKE, approximately 50 IPsec devices can be managed
easily. Larger networks are supported in the centralized op-
eration mode called key distribution (KD). Key agreement
mode offers robustness against failure of IPsec devices and
network errors, while maintaining fair scalability.
Based upon a medium scale scenario described in the next
section, MIKE and IDP seem to be the best solution for
automated network encryption. IDP detects IPsec capable
devices, while group key management is done by MIKE.
We want to analyze how the combination of these two com-
ponents is going to perform.
3. Scenario
An international research project sketched a typical net-
work, as it may be deployed within a coalitional opera-
tion [2]. The following requirements and conditions have
been identified:
– nations want to protect their red national networks;
– the national local area networks (LANs) are intercon-
nected by public wide area networks (WANs);
– nations want to exchange information seamlessly at
the tactical level;
– strict WAN/LAN separation;
– no security guarantees are given by the WAN opera-
tor.
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The sketched network is shown in Fig. 2. IPv6 is used
to benefit from the advanced security and multicast capa-
bilities. The IPsec labeled components are border routers
with IPsec capabilities. We want to test if the IDPMIKE
solution deployed on these devices will enable seamless
interconnection of the national LANs.
Fig. 2. Network setup of a coalitional operation.
In a typical coalition network, the number of nations (and
national LANs) does not exceed a few dozens. So it is
not necessary to use IDP security gateways. Furthermore
MIKE can be used in key agreement mode.
Certificate distribution is possible with IDP, but it has been
deliberately kept out of the scope of this paper, since our
focus is on feasibility, scalability, and performance of the
network configuration. We consider certificates to be al-
ready deployed at the IPsec devices. The IDPMIKE solu-
tion is prepared for various kinds of public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) concepts and policy guidelines.
4. Test-bed
According to the sketched network in the section before,
a test-bed was built. The crucial components are the border
IPsec devices, drawn as two-parted rectangles in Fig. 2.
These devices are COTS hardware products, namely PCs
running a Fedora Core Linux kernel. IDP Version 3.1.4
runs in combination with MIKE Version 0.8 on these IPsec
devices. The realized test-bed is shown in Fig. 3.
Overall ten IPsec devices were involved. For simplifica-
tion, a switch was used to interconnect the black routers.
In a real deployment this is done by a public WAN. All
connections were realized as 100 Mbit/s Ethernet. The up-
per three routers are border routers of the black network.
Open shortest path first (OSPF) or the protocol independent
multicast (PIM) [8] multicast routing protocol run between
these routers. The IPsec devices are drawn as triangles;
they contain the IDPMIKE solution. The IPsec devices
divide the network into the red network domain and the
black network domain. The lower routers are in the do-
Fig. 3. The realized test-bed.
main of the national LAN, providing secure network access
to clients.
The realized test net provides not the functionality of the
ideal network sketched before. Linux kernel does not sup-
port IPv6 multicast routing through IPsec yet. It is not
possible to route red IPv6 multicast traffic through IPsec
and across the black network to another red network. The
setting of the IPsec SA and SP according to the scenario
was correct. In independent experiments multicast routing
was proved to work correctly as well as IPsec but not both
in combination. The reason is that the Linux IPv6 multi-
cast routing procedure bypasses the netfilter API and IPsec
stack [3].
5. IDPMIKE interoperation
The interaction process between IDP and MIKE is divided
into three phases (Fig. 4). First the discovery process de-
tects a change in its internal connectivity tables. For ex-
ample an IPsec device joins or leaves the network. The
MIKE service is informed about the change by an UDP
datagram (Fig. 4, Step 1). In the second phase MIKE es-
tablishes a new group key and returns it via a datagram
answer to IDP (Fig. 4, Step 2). In the last phase IDP con-
figures the IPsec devices automatically (Fig. 4, Step 3).
The phases are now described in detail.
Fig. 4. Interacting sequence of IDP and MIKE.
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When an IDP instance starts up, it multicasts a hello mes-
sage periodically. Simultaneously it listens to any incoming
IDP message. All IDP instances receiving a hello message
add the sending IPsec device to their connectivity table if it
is not already added. Then they establish a unicast IPsec SA
to this device. This connection is secured by a pre-shared
key. The SA is used by the IPsec devices to announce its
IP network prefix to the newly discovered instance period-
ically. The prefixes are evaluated by the receivers and the
routing is updated accordingly. When no change in the net-
work is detected within four times of the hello interval, the
announcing of prefixes stops and only hello messages are
continued to be sent. If an IPsec device stops sending hello
messages it is considered down and all other IPsec devices
delete the according IPsec SAs, SPs and routing entries.
The pre-shared key of the SA is used for advertisement of
the prefixes only. In an improved version of the integration
this pre-shared key can be replaced by the dynamic MIKE
key.
After IDP detects a change in the network, MIKE is in-
formed about it. There are three IDP-to-MIKE messages
defined. One indicates a JOIN of an IPsec device. IDP re-
ports a newly discovered instance on every IPsec device, so
the joining device reports itself, too. The second indicates
a LEAVE event and the third event informs MIKE about
a RESTORE of an IPsec device. A RESTORE occurs if
an IPsec device is reconnected after its network connec-
tion temporary failed. A RESTORE is distinguished from
a restart by the hello messages originating from an already
known device. All hello messages carry a timestamp of
the startup time of the IDP instance. If the timestamp has
changed, a restart must have occurred, otherwise a RE-
STORE event occurred. Restarted IPsec devices are treated
as joining instances.
According to the indication reported by IDP, MIKE ex-
ecutes one of the following steps. If a JOIN event was
triggered, MIKE checks the IP address of the joined mem-
ber. If the IP address of the joining instance matches the
local IP address, the JOIN is executed and the IPsec de-
vice becomes a member of the secure MIKE group. If the
addresses differ, no action is performed. It is necessary
to check the addresses because only the newly discovered
instance can add itself to the MIKE.
The MIKE reacts to a RESTORE event similar as to
a JOIN event. Even if the instance is already in the MIKE
group, the join is executed (rejoin). This is necessary be-
cause the group key may have changed while the IPsec
device was temporarily disconnected. A forced rejoin re-
news the key and assures the proper distribution to all
IPsec devices.
While JOIN and RESTORE event are executed by the newly
(re)discovered instance, the LEAVE event is only processed
by the current MIKE transaction manager. If the TM is
supposed to leave the group itself, it hands over the TM
status to another IPsec device before leaving. After the
handover, the new TM excludes the old one. To put it all
together: a LEAVE detected by IDP triggers the exclusion
of that member out of the MIKE group, thus rendering the
key of the excluded member useless.
After MIKE has finished its operation it informs the IDP
service about it. A short status report is sent, containing
a pointer to the new group key. In a final step, IDP writes
a multicast IPsec SA with the group key MIKE reported.
Establishing the unicast SA and SPs and the multicast SA
is done in parallel, as soon as a change is detected. The
multicast policy is left unchanged, because it has already
set at startup time.
During a bilateral workshop the sketched scenario and inter-
operation functionality was proved within the test-bed [4].
Mainly two test cases were examined:
1) successive addition of new members,
2) successive leave of members.
After each addition or leave the security associations were
checked at the IPsec devices. Joining was performed by
starting up IDP. A leave was simulated by shutting down an
IDP instance. It was possible to produce the same results by
physically disconnecting IPsec devices and reconnect them.
It shows the robustness and applicability of the protocol
combination in tactical networks.
The IDP waits four times of the hello interval before con-
sidering an instance to be down. This is the reason why it
handles flipping connections well. If a connection changes
between the up and down state periodically, this connec-
tion is considered valid. If the connection stays down for
longer than four times of the hello interval, it is considered
down. This prevents unnecessary key updates due to lost
hello datagrams.
6. Measurement setup
To analyze the scalability of our solution, measurements
were conducted. It had to be determined how long it takes
from connecting a network to finishing the setup of the
new group key. The measured time span reached from the
detection of other members of the intercoalition LAN to
the setup of the IPsec SAs at the new device is finished
(Fig. 5).
In a real deployment the IPsec devices are interconnected
through black routers. After an IPsec device is physically
connected to a router, it may take some time until all other
black routers have established routes to the newly connected
network. This delay is not taken into consideration, as is
relies heavily on the used routing protocol and its timeout
parameters.
It is also noted, that communication between different IPsec
devices is only possible, if the SAs are set up at both IPsec
devices. The difference between the set-up times at the
different IPsec devices is called dispersal. The dispersal
depends mainly on network delay and computational speed
of the IPsec devices. It was shown, that dispersal in a lo-
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Fig. 5. Time sequence of a measurement step.
cal 100 Mbit/s Ethernet network with homogenous IPsec
device hardware is minimal for MIKE [5]. Since the ad-
ditional delay imposed by IDP is constant, dispersal in the
IDPMIKE scenario may be also constant.
The test-bed shown in Fig. 3 was adopted for performance
measurements. All devices were interconnected by a switch,
no routers were involved. This simplification was necessary
to minimize routing protocol side effects and dispersal. The
number of clients was increased to ten IPsec devices to bet-
ter show scaling effects. The devices were interconnected
to each other, but IDPMIKE was not started at this point
in time. It simulated, that the devices were not able to
communicate. In a preparation step, two IDPMIKE IPsec
devices were started up. The devices discovered each other
and built up their IPsec SAs. One of them was determined
as monitor. The monitor measured for each IDP opera-
tion how long it takes from detecting a member to IDP
writing the multicast SA. The second IPsec device was re-
sponsible for holding the MIKE transaction manager sta-
Fig. 6. Latency of IDPMIKE.
tus before the actual measurement started. It is important
to have the same device being TM each time a measure-
ment is conducted, to ensure identical conditions for each
measurement step.
Writing the unicast SAs and multicast SAs is done simulta-
neously, when a change in the network is detected. For our
performance evaluation we assured the multicast SA to be
written first. This is done because the focus of our work is
in the establishment of multicast IPsec SAs.
After the preparation has finished, IDPMIKE starts up on
the remaining IPsec devices. The start up is time trig-
gered. All time triggered events were pre-calculated before
the measurements. The monitor logs the time after the SA
was written. After that, the second IP-sec device takes over
the TM status. The group size is increased by starting up
another IDPMIKE device. This is done until all IPsec de-
vices have started up. The difference between the startup
time and the time the SA is plotted in Fig. 6. Ten repetitions
are done resulting in 80 values.
All IPsec devices are time synchronized using the network
time protocol (NTP) [17]. Update interval and an adopted
kernel are utilized to keep time synchronization error
below 1 ms [6].
7. Results
The delay imposed by IDP and MIKE before a secure
connection is established is about 400 ms. In Fig. 6 the
measured delays are drawn. As a second result it is ob-
served that the delay hardly increases when the group be-
comes larger. Indeed the delay increases with a small linear
factor with the group size due to the MIKE key establish-
ment algorithm. But the growth is too little to be visible
is the diagram. The performance of MIKE was analyzed
in [5] in detail. The measure data is reprinted in Fig. 7.
As for a group size of ten, the delay imposed by MIKE
is about 50 ms and will not exceed 80 ms at a group size
of 50 members.
Fig. 7. Delay of MIKE in larger groups.
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To further investigate the composition of the delay, two
measurement points were analyzed in more detail (Fig. 8).
The communication overhead for signaling changes to
MIKE and the way back is very small. So the interpro-
cess communication is not a bottleneck.
Fig. 8. Delay splitted up.
Surprisingly the vast majority of time is consumed by
deleting the old IPsec multicast SA and writing the new
one. If the duration for writing the unicast SA is taken
into account, the delay is about 200 ms longer. The
Linux setkey command can be used to manually create
IPsec SAs. The time it takes for writing an IPsec SA can
be determined by calling the time command in conjunc-
tion with setkey as shown in Fig. 9. The manual creation
of an IPsec SA took about 200 ms. The result was verified
on different machines. The execution duration is dependant
on the CPU power of the machine.
Fig. 9. Performance of setkey on a 2.53 GHz P4.
In the available, preliminary version of IDP setkey is
called via the system directive. The usage of the PF KEY
API [7] instead of system may lead to smaller delays.
8. Summary
We showed automated network encryption to be manage-
able by combining the discovery algorithm of IDP and the
key management of MIKE. In the test deployment, a full
intercoalition network with all involved components such
as protocol independent multicast routers and IPsec devices
was proven to be working. Our approach enables dynamic
and automated multicast traffic protection. This minimizes
setup times for intercoalition networks. In a later enhance-
ment of the protocol, the pre-shared key used for IDP prefix
advertisement traffic can be replaced by the common group
key supplied by MIKE. We were able to show that adding
a multicast network to an existing coalition network can be
performed within 400 ms with strong security guarantees.
The obtained measurement results indicate that IDP in com-
bination with MIKE scales well with increasing network
size. The delay is expected to be smaller, once a different
interface to set IPsec security associations is used.
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